Deep neural networks have recently demonstrated excellent performance on various tasks. Despite recent advances, our understanding of these learning models is still incomplete, at least, as their unexpected vulnerability to imperceptibly small, non-random perturbations revealed. The existence of these so-called adversarial examples presents a serious problem of the application of vulnerable machine learning models. In this paper, we introduce the layerwise origin-target synthesis (LOTS) that can serve multiple purposes. First, we can use it as a visualization technique that gives us insights into the function of any intermediate feature layer by showing the notion of a particular input in deep neural networks. Second, our approach can be applied to assess the invariance of the learned features captured at any layer with respect to the class of the particular input. Finally, it can also be utilized as a general way for producing a vast amount of diverse adversarial examples that can be used for training to further improve the robustness of machine learning models and their performance as well.
INTRODUCTION
Due to the tremendous progress of the last several years, the most advanced deep neural networks (DNNs) have managed to approach and even surpass human level performance on a wide range of challenging machine learning tasks (Parkhi et al., 2015; Schroff et al., 2015; He et al., 2016) . Despite the fact that we are able to design and train well performing learning models, our understanding of these complex networks is still incomplete, at least. This was highlighted by the discovery of the intriguing properties of machine learning models by Szegedy et al. (2014) .
Gaining intuitive insights and, thus, building a better understanding of how these models work has a long history in the literature. For visual recognition tasks, various techniques have been proposed to address the problem of understanding what kind of features are captured and used by learning models (Erhan et al., 2009; Mahendran & Vedaldi, 2016) and how the different internal representations of object classes or input images can be better visualized (Zeiler & Fergus, 2014; Yosinski et al., 2015; Simonyan et al., 2014; Mahendran & Vedaldi, 2016) .
While exploring the internal details of DNNs in order to further advance their performance via visualization is particularly relevant and the subject of this paper, recent research has been also focusing on the unpleasant properties revealed by Szegedy et al. (2014) . Namely, machine learning models, including the best performing DNNs, suffer from highly unexpected instability as they can confidently misclassify adversarial examples that are formed by adding imperceptible, non-random perturbations to otherwise correctly classified inputs. As DNNs are expected to be robust to small perturbations to their inputs due to their excellent generalization capabilities, the existence of such adversarial perturbations challenges our understanding of DNNs, and questions the usability of such vulnerable learning models in real-world applications. Researchers proposed various techniques to reliably find adversarial perturbations (Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow et al., 2015; Sabour et al., 2016; Rozsa et al., 2016) , and demonstrated that adversarial examples can serve a good purpose as well, as they can be successfully used for training to improve both the overall performance and the robustness of machine learning models (Goodfellow et al., 2015; Rozsa et al., 2016 Under review as a conference paper at ICLR 2017
In this paper, we introduce the layerwise origin-target synthesis (LOTS) that can be efficiently used for multiple tasks. First, it can be applied to visualize the internal representation of an input captured by the learning model at any particular layer. Second, LOTS is capable of forming a vast amount of diverse adversarial examples for each input, and such diversity can be beneficial for adversarial training as it was demonstrated by Rozsa et al. (2016) . Finally, derived from the previous possible utilization, LOTS can be also used to explore and assess how stable a particular internal representation of an input is with respect to the class of the input. This paper introduces our novel approach, compares it to related work, and highlights its benefits and possible directions of future work.
RELATED WORK
While deep neural networks (DNNs) have achieved excellent performances on various tasks, there is an increasing interest to alleviate their vulnerability to adversarial examples. To better understand the sometimes unexpected behavior of learning models, visualizing the learned features is a common practice for gaining intuitive insights. As our work is related to the visualization of feature representations and adversarial instability, this section discusses the relationships to both areas in detail.
VISUALIZATION
To be able to efficiently design and train better performing machine learning models, it is useful to have a clearer understanding about the internal operations and behavior of these complex models. Otherwise, research aiming to develop more advanced learning models remains restricted to trialand-error.
Visualization of DNNs was pioneered by Erhan et al. (2009) who displayed high level features learned by various models at the unit level by finding the optimal stimulus for each unit in the image space that maximizes the activation of the particular unit. While their approach requires careful initialization, it cannot provide information about the invariance of the inspected units. To address this short-coming, Simonyan et al. (2014) demonstrated how image-specific class saliency maps can be obtained from the last fully connected layers of DNNs, showing areas of the image that are discriminative with respect to a given class. The authors also introduced a technique -image inverting -to generate artificial images for classes that maximize the selected class score. Related to saliency maps, showed that identifying regions of images yielding high activations at higher layers can be successfully used for object detection. Zeiler & Fergus (2014) extended visualization to convolutional features. Furthermore, their approach not only finds patches of input images that stimulate a particular feature map, but is also capable of revealing structures within those patches by using a top-down projection.
Although these visualization techniques helped to gain insights into how and why DNNs might work, researchers proposed various approaches to further enhance the produced representations that are commonly called as pre-images. Yosinski et al. (2015) visualized activations on each layer for an image or video, and introduced methods to produce qualitatively clearer and more interpretable visual representations. Similarly, Mahendran & Vedaldi (2016) presented regularized visualizations for maximized activations and inverted images in order to obtain natural looking pre-images.
Our main goal with LOTS is to explore how the extracted features of an input image at any given layer translate back to the input space, and how invariant those features are with respect to the class of the particular input. Szegedy et al. (2014) revealed that machine learning models, including state-of-the-art DNNs, are vulnerable to adversarial examples that are formed by applying imperceptibly small, non-random perturbations to otherwise correctly recognized inputs, leading to misclassifications. This discovery fundamentally challenged our understanding of DNNs, namely, the excellent performance achieved by these complex models was believed to be due to their capability of learning features from the training set that generalize well. The existence of adversarial examples highlights that machine learning models are in fact not robust, and the unpleasant adversarial instability needs to be addressed.
ADVERSARIAL REPRESENTATIONS
Since Szegedy et al. (2014) presented the problem and introduced the first method that is able to reliably find adversarial perturbations, various approaches were proposed in the literature. Compared to the computationally expensive box-constrained optimization technique (L-BFGS) of Szegedy et al. (2014) , a more lightweight, yet more effective technique was introduced by Goodfellow et al. (2015) . The proposed fast gradient sign (FGS) method relies on the sign of the gradient of loss which needs to be calculated only once in order to form an adversarial perturbation. The authors also demonstrated that by using FGS examples implicitly in an enhanced objective function, both the overall performance and the robustness of the trained models can be improved.
Both of the aforementioned adversarial example generation techniques rely on gradient ascent, namely, the formed perturbation causes misclassification by increasing the loss until the particular original class does not have the highest prediction probability. Non-gradient based methods were also proposed by researchers. The approach of Sabour et al. (2016) produces adversarial images that not only cause misclassifications but also mimic the internal representations of the targeted original inputs. Their technique also uses the computationally expensive L-BFGS optimization algorithm. Rozsa et al. (2016) introduced the non-gradient based hot/cold approach, which causes recognition errors by not only reducing the prediction probability of the original class of the input, but by aiming to magnify the probability of the specified targeted class. Therefore, this approach is capable of efficiently producing multiple adversarial examples for each input. The authors demonstrated that using a diverse set of such adversarial examples with higher magnitudes of perturbations than the sufficient minimal causing misclassifications can outperform regular adversarial training. Finally, Rozsa et al. (2016) proposed a new metric called perceptual adversarial similarity score (PASS) to better measure adversarial, in other words, the distinguishability or similarity of original and adversarial image pairs in terms of human perception.
Our novel LOTS method can be considered as a general extension of the hot/cold approach to deeper layers, and it also shows similarities to the technique of Sabour et al. (2016) in terms of directly adjusting internal feature representations -without requiring the use of the L-BFGS algorithm.
APPROACH
One way of gaining insights into the operation of a deep neural network is by letting the network process a given image and -after modifying the output of the network -projecting this modification back to the input level, e.g, via backpropagation. While changing the output appears to be straightforward due to our clear(er) understanding of its meaning, e.g., the hot/cold approach (Rozsa et al., 2016) modifying logits, theoretically, the modification can happen at any layer or any neuron of the network. However, the interpretation of such modifications might be more difficult as the output of a given layer or neuron per se is not guaranteed to have a semantic meaning.
Formally, let us consider a network f w with weights w in a layered structure, i.e., having layers y (l) , l = {1, . . . , L}, with their respective weights w (l) . For a given input x, the output of the network can be formalized as:
while the internal representation of the given input x at layer l is:
Our layerwise origin-target synthesis (LOTS) approach aims to adjust the internal representation of an input x o , the origin, to get closer to an arbitrarily selected input x t , the target. Similar to the hot/cold approach, we modify the internal feature representation of x o at a given layer l to step away from the origin and, in parallel, get closer to the target x t , and project this feature difference back to the input level. To do so, LOTS calculates the gradient of the difference between the feature representations for x o and x t with respect to the origin x o :
This gradient can be effectively used to form adversarial perturbations using a line-search, similarly to the fast gradient sign (FGS) method (Goodfellow et al., 2015) or the hot/cold approach, by adding a multiple of η to the original image x o . Compared to FGS, LOTS has the potential to produce dramatically more and more diverse adversarial perturbations for each input, enabled by the tremendous amount of possible targets that can be specified, and by the number of layers LOTS can be used on.
More conservatively, a simpler way of using LOTS can be obtained by targeting the origin itself, and magnifying or reducing the internal representation of input x o at layer l. This can be formalized as:
While this direction can be utilized to form adversarial perturbations, it can also visualize the captured internal representations of the input at layer l. Furthermore, by exploring the magnitudes of perturbations necessary to cause misclassifications, we can assess the robustness of inspected layers with respect to the class of the particular input.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that LOTS can serve multiple purposes and is computationally efficient as those gradients of interest can be calculated via regular backpropagation. For our experiments, we used Caffe (Jia et al., 2014) , however, LOTS can be implemented in other frameworks.
VISUALIZATION VIA LOTS
First, we focus on demonstrating the visualization capabilities of LOTS, exploring the captured internal representations of various types of inputs on different DNNs. Here, we investigate two different types of publicly available deep neural networks: the handwritten digit classification network LeNet from LeCun et al. (1998) , distributed with Caffe (Jia et al., 2014) , that was trained on the MNIST dataset (LeCun et al., 1995) , and the VGG face recognition network from Parkhi et al. (2015) .
To measure the quality of the perturbed images, we compute and display three different metrics: L 2 and L ∞ norms of the scaled perturbations s · η (l) , as well as the perceptual adversarial similarity score (PASS) (Rozsa et al., 2016 ) between x o and x ± o . Note that throughout our experiments, we form perturbed images that have discrete pixel values in [0, 255].
INTERNAL REPRESENTATION OF HANDWRITTEN DIGITS
In order to visualize the internal representations of various layers of LeNet, we apply Equation (4) to all four layers, individually. When we use the positive sign and add the weighted gradient to the image, formally, x + o = x o + s · η (l) (x o ) with weight s ∈ N + , the captured internal representation is magnified, and the classification of the modified digit x + o will usually not change. On the other hand, by using the negative sign for forming an image
, we can display which kind of modifications would be required to inhibit the internal representation of given origin x o at that particular layer. Consequently, with increasing weight s, the network is more likely to classify x − o differently than the origin x o as feature representations of the original class are slowly fading away. 
INTERNAL REPRESENTATION OF FACES
LOTS is capable of displaying more difficult objects, and can be used to visualize more complex classes than the digits of MNIST. To demonstrate that, we generate x − o and x + o images for various layers of the VGG Face network (Parkhi et al., 2015) . Figure 2 shows some distorted samples with the corresponding perturbations generated by modifying the internal representations captured at various layers of the VGG Face network, for the exemplary image taken from the VGG Face Dataset (Parkhi et al., 2015) shown in Figure 2 In summary, the visualized internal feature representations of the origin suggest that lower convolutional layers of the VGG Face model have managed to learn and capture features that provide semantically meaningful and interpretable representations to human observers. Although we can still recognize facial features and parts on visualized feature representations captured at higher layers, closer to the last layer those become harder to interpret. This can be due to the fact that closer to last layer the model needs features that allow for differentiating identities from one another, hence, those features can be small for visualization, and even semantically meaningless for us.
LOTS OF ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES
Now, let us exploit the instability of DNNs and show how LOTS can be applied to generate adversarial examples. When forming adversarial examples using LOTS, throughout our conducted experiments we generate "targeted" adversarial images. For a given origin image x o , we aim to form an imperceptibly small adversarial perturbation which makes the DNN classify it as the class of the target image x t . In order to do so, we can exploit Equation (3) to compute a perturbation η (l) (x o , x t ) for the origin at any given layer, and use it to generate the targeted adversarial image
where s ∈ N + is specified such that the adversarial perturbation has the lowest magnitude necessary for reaching the targeted class. For adversarial example generation, we use the same networks as before: we commence our experiments forming adversarial perturbations for MNIST digits that exploit the vulnerability of the LeNet model, then we turn to the more challenging task of manipulating internal representations of faces to cause misclassifications on the VGG Face model.
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES OF HANDWRITTEN DIGITS
Let us consider an image of digit 4 as origin that we would like to turn to a 9 -at least, when LeNet classifies it. After selecting an applicable image of 9 for being the target, we can use the extracted feature representations of the target and the origin to form the adversarial perturbation. As shown in Figure 3 , we use the same origin image as in Figure 1(a) and a selected target image (cf. Figure 3(b) ) that looks relatively similar to the origin, but is clearly from another class. and their corresponding perturbations of handwritten digits generated with LOTS using the origin from (a) and target from (b). Each subfigure shows the targeted adversarial image x t o and the perturbation s · η (l) (xo, xt), while the sub-captions show the name of layer l, the classification of x t o , the PASS score between origin and the adversarial image, and the L2 and L∞ norms of the perturbation.
When generating the targeted adversarial example x t o by manipulating the internal feature representations captured at the first convolution layer (CONV1), we can clearly see that the perturbation focuses on the difference between the original 4 and the targeted 9, as shown in Figure 3 (c). Moving to higher layers (CONV2, IP1 and IP2), we can observe that the adversarial perturbations lose the focus more and more on the global structure. Interestingly, the perturbations have smaller L 2 and L ∞ norms, but also lower PASS scores, which indicates that the adversarial images generated at lower layers are more indistinguishable from the origin, in other words, they are better in terms of adversarial quality.
ADVERSARIAL EXAMPLES OF FACES
A higher threat for automatic face recognition systems is presented by the possibility to generate targeted adversarial examples from face images. In DNN-based face recognition systems, usually the last layer of the network (containing the identities) is disregarded, and the output of the penultimate layer (e.g., FC7 of the VGG Face model) is stored as a representation of the face. When an adversary steals this representation of a target (without requiring the possession of the target image) and also has access to the original network, he can generate an image that looks like himself to a human operator, but is identified as the target identity by the network.
Given the internal representation f (l) w (x t ) of a target image x t representing identity t (Sean Bean in Figure 4(b) ) at a given layer l of the network, and an origin image x o including its internal representation f Figure 4(a) ), we can generate the perturbation η (l) (x o , x t ) using Equation (3), and form the targeted adversarial image x t o . As shown in Figure 4 , the adversarial images are basically indistinguishable from the original images (especially for higher layers such as FC6 and FC7) as indicated by the very high PASS scores, yet the network classifies them incorrectly as the target.
We have observed that, in general, LOTS cannot produce high quality adversarial examples at the lower layers. In fact, this behavior is not surprising as internal representations of origin-target image pairs closer to the input space are usually very different. To alleviate this problem, the target image needs to be carefully chosen. For example, considering the VGG Face Dataset, finding a target image with a similar pose can probably boost the quality of the formed adversarial images. Alternatively, forming an adversarial example using another technique -e.g., the hot/cold approach which is also capable of targeting an arbitrary class -and then using that sample as the target of LOTS would mitigate the problem, as, by definition, an adversarial example is indistinguishable from the original.
Finally, LOTS can be modified to perform better, in reverse, it would be computationally more expensive. Namely, instead of taking the gradient of the feature difference with respect to the origin once and using it throughout the whole line-search, we can also consider calculating the gradient images and their corresponding perturbations of face images generated with LOTS using the origin from (a) and target from (b). Each subfigure shows the targeted adversarial image x t o and the perturbation s · η (l) (xo, xt), while the sub-captions show the name of the layer l, the classification of x t o , the PASS score between origin and the adversarial example, and the L2 and L∞ norms of the perturbation. multiple times. This "step-and-adjust" optimization would potentially improve both the quality of the produced adversarial examples and the capability of LOTS to reach the target.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented new ways to visualize how objects are internally represented in deep neural networks (DNNs). Using our novel layerwise origin-target synthesis (LOTS) algorithm, we have shown internal representations of two well-known DNNs: the hand-written digit recognition network LeNet, and the face recognition network from VGG. We have demonstrated that LOTS can be efficiently used for multiple purposes. First, we can visualize the captured internal structure of an input at any layer of DNNs via gradient ascent or descent with respect to the input. We can also gain intuitive insights into the interpretation of a given input by DNNs, as we can magnify what the network at a particular layer "thinks" the object is or is not about. Second, the stability of the captured internal feature representations can be assessed with respect to the class of the input, by exploring how robust they are to perturbations aiming at magnifying or reducing them. Third, we have demonstrated that LOTS is capable of producing a large number of diverse adversarial examples for each input by modifying the internal structure of the original input to mimic the particular target. This application of LOTS can help us to get a deeper understanding about the intrinsic features that differentiate classes in various layers of DNNs.
Using LOTS, lots of diverse adversarial images can be generated for each input. Future work can consider applying those to adversarial training. As LOTS allows for generating adversarial examples at any layer, we believe that networks trained with those perturbed examples will be more stable in each layer and, therewith, achieve better overall performance.
